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Abstract 
Climate change is one of the most important global challenges in the twenty-first century, 
given that a changing climate is likely to have negative and potentially irreversible 
consequences for the environment and human beings. Drawing upon Social Representations 
Theory and Identity Process Theory from social psychology, we argue that research should 
focus upon, and successfully integrate, three levels of analysis, namely (1) how climate 
change knowledge is constructed and circulates (social representation); (2) the role of 
identity in relation to these representations (identity); and (3) how people might respond to 
them (action). It is suggested that identity processes may determine how people process 
social representations of climate change, and that they mediate the link between 
representations and environmental behaviour. Understanding human responses to climate 
change necessitates an integrative social sciences perspective, in terms of disciplinary, 
theoretical and methodological approaches. 
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Introduction 
Climate change is one of the most important global challenges in the twenty-first century, yet 
an understanding of public reactions to this issue remains noticeably incomplete. Public 
resistance to changing relevant behaviours remains a key issue for research, especially given 
apparent increases in public awareness of the scientific arguments (Exley & Christie, 2003). 
Recently, scholars have argued that climate change communicators should take into 
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consideration the prevailing attitudes, values and psychological ‘needs’ of their audiences 
(Crompton & Kasser, 2010; Kahan, 2010). This paper attempts to complement this research 
by marrying a variety of theoretical observations in an integrative model which links social 
representation, self-identity and socio-psychological action. These three factors have not yet 
been studied extensively in the context of climate change and the links between them have 
not been studied at all. In this article we show how these factors may help determine how 
individuals and groups deal with climate change as a complex problem and make it their own.  
 We outline these different levels of analysis in an integrative model, which we 
apply to existing research on climate change, and provide the theoretical tools for future 
empirical research. This paper provides a critical synthesis of current debates around identity 
and social representations and applies them to the issue of climate change communication, 
focusing in particular on the development of social representations and processes of identity 
formation. We want this paper to initiate sa conversation and stimulate empirical research. 
 
Social Representations of Climate Change 
Social sciences approaches to climate change are concerned with understanding how this 
environmental problem is represented in society, on the one hand, and how people think and 
feel about it, on the other. Our theoretical model strives to address both of these issues within 
an integrated framework that draws upon Social Representations Theory (SRT). SRT treats 
seriously the information that circulates in society (e.g. in the media, in school textbooks and 
literature) and the ideas in people’s minds (Moscovici, 1988). It provides a framework for 
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understanding and exploring how scientific knowledge, such as that associated with the 
climate change debate, diffuses in society and can become associated with intergroup power 
struggles. A social representation is defined as a system of values, ideas and practices 
regarding a given social object, as well as the elaboration of that object by a group for the 
purpose of communicating and behaving. Accordingly, it provides a given group with a 
shared social ‘reality’ and ‘common consciousness’ vis-à-vis a particular social object.  
SRT was originally designed to understand how constructs and theories pertaining 
to the scientific domain make their transition into public discourse and layperson ‘common-
sense’, hence it is well placed to offer insights into the public understanding of climate 
change. Social representations of climate change facilitate sense-making of a potentially 
obscure and esoteric environmental phenomenon originating from the scientific domain. An 
SRT approach to climate change enables researchers to gain insights into the ways in which 
climate change is represented in channels of societal information and the ways in which it is 
deployed cognitively and rhetorically by social actors in communication (Jaspal & Nerlich, 
2013; Olausson, 2011; Smith & Joffe, 2013).  
 
Constructors of Social Representations 
Social representations exist at the level of groups and individuals and facilitate 
communication. Sources of societal information such as the media can help develop social 
representations, since “[a]s a forum for the discourses of others and a speaker in their own 
right, the media have a key part in the production and transformation of meanings” 
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(Carvalho, 2007, p. 224). Furthermore, it is necessary to “properly acknowledge the news 
media as the primary intermediary between science, politics, and the citizens, as well as their 
agenda-setting role for citizens’ meaning making on climate change” (Olausson, 2011). Yet, 
both the media and individuals function as co-constructors of social representations 
(Breakwell, 2001), and there is an important and dynamic interplay between media 
representation, identity and personal experience (Smith & Joffe, 2013).  
Social representations can develop and change over time and, unless ‘hegemonic’ 
(dominant), are open to contestation and re-formulation in everyday discourse (Marková, 
2003). They provide the backdrop against which individuals and groups develop their own 
beliefs (Jaspal, Nerlich & Koteyko, 2013). It is therefore important to understand the 
available repertoire of social representations of climate change in particular contexts, through 
the analysis of print media and television coverage, for instance. Some SRT researchers of 
climate change have begun to do this (e.g. Höijer, 2010; Jaspal & Nerlich, 2013; Olausson, 
2010, 2011). 
 
Types of Social Representation 
Moscovici (1988) has postulated three types of social representation: hegemonic, 
emancipated and polemic. A hegemonic representation is one that is shared consensually by 
members of a group; they are coercive and uniform. The notion that the climate is changing 
largely as a result of human-induced industrial developments in the Western world constitutes 
a hegemonic representation within the global scientific community (Houghton et al., 2001), 
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although the status of this representation seems to be different in the US (Leiserowitz, 2005). 
An emancipated representation is developed by subgroups within a larger social collective as 
a result of outgrowths of information and distinctive knowledge within these subgroups. 
Emancipated representations constitute ‘developments’ or minor amendments of the over-
arching hegemonic representation. For instance, while the hegemonic representation is that 
anthropogenic climate change will have negative outcomes, an emancipated representation 
among Maldiveans (a subgroup within the superordinate community of ‘believers’) is that 
climate change is likely to result in the complete submergence of the Maldives resulting in a 
massive refugee problem (Minivan News, 2012). A polemic representation is one which is 
generated in the course of social conflict, and characterised by antagonistic relations between 
groups. A vivid example of this is the rivalry between the majority of climate scientists, who 
argue that climate change is dangerous and largely dependent upon human activities, and 
climate critics, who challenge the legitimacy of this hegemonic representation (Jaspal et al., 
2013; McCright, 2007).  
Hegemonic, emancipated and polemic representations seem to affect the climate 
change agenda differently. Hegemonic representations are usually more likely to shape 
attitudes because they are coercive, shared at a mass scale and thus difficult to re-construe or 
reject (Breakwell, 2001). Conversely, polemic representations are often perceived as being 
peripheral to ‘mainstream’ thinking and thus unworthy of attention (e.g. McCright, 2007). 
Thus, it is plausible that relevant groups may attempt to ‘upgrade’ their polemic or 
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emancipated representations of climate change to hegemonic status in order to advance their 
personal/collective goals (Jaspal et al., 2013). 
The representational field in which climate change as a social and cultural issue is 
located seems to be characterised by all three kinds of social representation (Hulme, 2009). 
Polemic representations can rise in prominence and gradually become hegemonic due partly 
to the media’s balancing norms, whereby ‘both sides of the story’ are presented in order to 
safeguard ‘objectivity’ (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004). The psychologically preferable, though 
scientifically indefensible representation may ultimately be adopted by the general 
population. Conversely, the representation that is grounded in science and empiricism may be 
ousted from its hegemonic position. This paper examines how and why this may happen. 
 
Processes of Social Representational Formation 
Two socio-psychological processes underlie the formation of representations, namely 
anchoring and objectification. Understanding how these processes function in relation to 
climate change is important (Höijer, 2010). Anchoring reflects the categorisation of 
unfamiliar objects through their comparison with an existing stock of familiar and culturally 
accessible objects. Recent empirical studies have demonstrated a widespread tendency for 
individuals to anchor climate change to ozone depletion, which constitutes the basis of their 
understanding of climate change, especially in the UK context (Lorenzoni et al., 2006; Smith 
& Joffe, 2013. This highlights the importance of a culturally sensitive, relativist 
epistemological approach to representations of climate change. In Germany, for example, a 
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group of scientists constructed climate change in terms of an ‘impending climatic 
catastrophe’ by anchoring it to extreme weather events, such as flooding, in 1987, and the 
resultant social representation affected political discourse surrounding climate change 
(Weingart, Engels & Pansegrau, 2000). Thus, the ‘catastrophe’ anchoring clearly has an 
important role to play in rendering the global challenge of climate change culturally and 
psychologically accessible to laypeople, but is generally rejected by climate critics. 
Objectification transforms unfamiliar and abstract objects into concrete and 
‘objective’ common-sense realities. Moscovici and Hewstone (1983) have identified three 
sub-processes associated with objectification, namely personification of knowledge, 
figuration and ontologisation. Personification of knowledge links the abstract object to a 
person or a group, providing the object with a more concrete existence through this 
association. For instance, the former US presidential candidate Al Gore has, in many ways, 
served as a personification of the climate change debate in the US both in terms of a rallying 
point for those who aim to mitigate the effects of climate change and for those who are 
sceptical of such endeavours.  
Furthermore, recent media analyses have demonstrated that the objects of social 
representation (e.g. the planet) can also be personified in order to achieve emotive rhetorical 
effects (Jaspal & Nerlich, 2013). Figuration refers to the process whereby an abstract object is 
dominated by metaphorical imagery, which renders it more psychologically and culturally 
accessible. For instance, in her discussion of bloggers’ responses to the ‘Climategate’ affair, 
Nerlich (2010) notes the repeated use of the religious metaphor ‘preaching’ in relation to 
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climate change communication. This provides a concrete image for scientific dissemination 
of climate change, constructing it as speculative, unscientific and irrational. Ontologisation 
refers to the process whereby physical characteristics are attributed to something non-
physical, essentially ‘materialising’ the immaterial. In her analysis of the Swedish press, 
Olausson (2010, p. 146) observes that climate change is ontologised in terms of ‘smoke 
stacks, exhaust pipes, heavy vehicles and smoke’, suggesting its overall objectification in 
terms of perceptible and visible pollution. In media and layperson discourses, the processes 
of anchoring and objectification have engendered particular social representations of climate 
change.  
 
A Key Social Representation of Climate Change 
Existing SRT research into climate change communication suggests the existence of some 
key social representations in Western industrialised societies (Höijer, 2010; Olausson, 2010, 
2011; Smith & Joffe, 2013. The notion that anthropogenic climate change is largely a 
human-induced environmental problem constitutes a hegemonic representation, which has 
been encouraged since at least 1988 (Jaspal & Nerlich, 2013). However, this representation is 
habitually contested in public, media and political discourse by competing polemic 
representations. For instance, some climate critics tend to emphasise the ‘natural’ (cyclical) 
dimension of climate change and to attenuate the human contribution to it (McCright, 2007). 
Therefore, the polemic representation has infiltrated public understanding. Bostrom (2001) 
reports the results of a national survey of American adults in 1995, which revealed that 42% 
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of respondents attributed climate change to both ‘natural’ processes and human activities, 
18% attributed it solely to nature, and the remaining 40% believed that human behaviour was 
the major cause of climate change. These data, though somewhat dated, suggest that there 
have been at least three understandings of the causes of climate change. The hegemonic 
representation of anthropogenic climate change might encourage individuals to re-think their 
own behaviour and to engage in some form of mitigation. Conversely, polemic 
representations that attach greater priority to natural processes are likely to encourage 
individuals to do nothing, since any attempt to mitigate climate change is regarded as futile. 
Interestingly, Bostrom and Lashof (2007) argue that (social representational) conflation 
between climate and weather, which is widespread in media and public discourse, may in fact 
lead the public to consider climate change as unrelated to human conduct and, thus, 
uncontrollable.  
The hegemonic social representation of anthropogenic climate change gives rise to 
an understanding that in order to mitigate climate change, individuals will need to change 
their behaviour and that national and regional institutions will need to re-think current 
economic and industrial policies. The particular sorts of change required constitute the 
peripheral elements of this social representation. For instance, Abrahamse et al. (2009) 
discusses the role of meat consumption in human-induced climate change, while the 
UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol stipulated obligatory emissions reduction targets for participating 
countries. International organisations and national governments generally agree that 
emissions reductions are a necessary mitigation strategy at the institutional level (although 
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policy initiatives regarding mitigation vary). This stance is challenged by the competing 
polemic representations associated with conservative think tanks in the US, which question 
the reality of climate change. 
Some scholars argue that it is important to encourage ‘alarming’ social 
representations, given that climate change is alarming (Risbey, 2008). Conversely, Bostrom 
and Lashof (2007) make the observation that promoting representations of catastrophe and 
calamity in climate change communication in the absence of information concerning 
causality or mitigation strategies can prove ineffective and counterproductive (see also 
Moser, 2007). Empirical studies have shown that inducing fear can change people’s attitudes 
and affect their stated concerns at the verbal level, but there is little evidence that this induces 
long-term behaviour change (Ruiter, Abraham & Kok, 2001). In order to facilitate change, 
Leiserowitz (2007) argues, communicators ought to highlight the potential local and regional 
impact of climate change, which essentially renders climate change a relevant and 
noteworthy issue for the group targeted. This implicitly highlights the potential role of 
identity – local, regional, group identities – in determining how people will  view and 
respond to climate change.  
Social representations of climate change alone cannot be regarded as catalysts for 
behaviour change (Dunwoody, 2007). Rather, researchers must factor into any model of 
communication, understanding and action the role of identity processes which likely mediate 
the relationship between social representation and action (Breakwell, 2010). Particular socio-
11	  
	  
psychological factors govern the internalisation, acceptance and rejection of these 
representations. The next section of the paper explores some of these factors. 
 
Identity: Individual and Group Levels 
Leiserowitz (2007, p. 57) has argued that an important strategy for optimising climate change 
communication is to ‘tailor messages and messengers for particular interpretive 
communities’. He argues that groups who share particular risk representations, values and 
socio-demographic characteristics might respond to climate change representations in similar 
ways (Leiserowitz et al., 2012). However, this approach overlooks the agentive role of 
identity in human responses to climate change. By identity, we mean the total identity of the 
individual that comprises social group memberships, interpersonal relations, exposure to 
social representations and individual behaviour (Jaspal & Breakwell, 2014).  
Individuals are not just passive recipients of representations but rather they play an 
active role in constructing and contributing to them. Moreover, they filter them through 
particular interpretative lenses which themselves are the product of identity (Agyeman et al., 
2007). Here it is argued that the missing link between social representations and social action 
may be identity. We begin by discussing group memberships as aspects of identity, followed 
by the predictable states of identity that are sought by individuals, and how they may be 
affected by particular representations of climate change 
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Groups and Social Representations 
In her synthesis of SRT and the social identity approach, Breakwell (1993) describes the 
dynamic process of social representational formation at the level of the social group. The 
social group level is important because category memberships form part of the total identity 
of the individual. Social representations intersect both discourse and human perception – they 
are constructed in the media and through everyday layperson talk and are, therefore, the 
product of the dialectics between the two (Marková, 2003). Yet, it is also true that groups can 
engineer and encourage representations, which are consistent with their aims and interests 
(Breakwell, 1993). Accordingly, it is important to examine the intergroup power differentials 
characterising relations between groups involved in social representational formation. More 
powerful social groups (e.g. climate think tanks) in the climate debate will have the power to 
shape decisively the formation of representations of climate change and to impose them upon 
less powerful groups (e.g. laypeople).  
Group power is a complex phenomenon. In the climate debate, climate scientists 
might plausibly be said to constitute a ‘powerful’ group, given the positive cultural 
constructions of science (Irwin, 1995), while sceptical laypeople may be thought of as less 
‘powerful’. However, in the context of climate change communication, the aforementioned 
group power hypothesis becomes less straightforward. Boykoff and Boykoff (2004) have 
shown how the journalistic norm of ‘balanced reporting’, whereby both sides of an argument 
are often afforded equal space and attention in the media, may skew public understanding in 
favour of what might usually be regarded as the ‘less powerful’ (i.e. climate critics) group in 
13	  
	  
the climate debate. This has been attributed to the observation that some climate sceptics or 
critics discursively exploit the scientific uncertainty which characterises the talk of climate 
scientists, as a means of constructing scientific observations concerning climate change as 
unreliable conjecture rather than ‘hard, indisputable science’ (Dryzek, Norgaard & 
Schlosberg, 2011). This is further reinforced by the successful mobilisation of anti-
environmental movements in the US, despite contrary assertions from climate scientists 
(McCright, 2007). In order to understand why groups might make use of their ‘power’ in 
order to project particular representations, it is useful to examine the functions served by 
social representations of climate change for the social groups and individuals involved in the 
debate.  
 Although groups sometimes engineer social representations to suit their 
agendas, it is true that social representations form organically in everyday communication. 
Thus, it is equally as important to examine the involuntary or ‘secondary’ effects that social 
representations can have for relevant social groups. For instance, reproducing the social 
representation that climate change is a myth can induce the de-legitimisation of climate 
scientists who conversely argue that climate change is a human-induced environmental 
problem. De-legitimisation can entail attributing negative characteristics to a group; 
categorising groups represented as contradicting the in-group ‘worldview’ as violators of key 
norms; and anchoring groups to existing groups that are already delegitimised in a given 
society. Some climate sceptics attempt to rationalise rhetorically their position in relation to 
climate change and to lend it credibility by reproducing social representations that contradict 
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those associated with climate scientists (McCright, 2007). Their reproduction of these 
representations can serve to delegitimise climate scientists, since they may be attributed 
negative characteristics such as ‘fundamentalist’ (Nerlich, 2010) or constructed as violating 
the norm of scientific professionalism (Jaspal et al., 2013).  
 However, groups do not function without individuals and group memberships 
form part of the total identity of the individual – thus, it is also necessary to examine the role 
of the individual in relation to social representation. 
 
Personalising Social Representations 
Given the dialectic relationship between media representation and perception, it is necessary 
to theorise how individuals might negotiate and respond to media content and other forms of 
representation (Olausson, 2011). Breakwell (1993, 2001) has outlined how individuals 
“personalise” social representations. Her model suggests that an individual’s relationship 
with a social representation can be described in terms of the following five dimensions: (i) 
awareness; (ii) understanding; (iii) acceptance; (iv) assimilation; and (v) salience. 
 Individuals differ in their awareness of a given social representation. Some 
may never encounter a social representation, while others may have full or at least partial 
knowledge of it. Awareness can be affected by a number of factors, such as previous personal 
experience of the ‘object’ of social representation or membership in particular social groups 
which provide access to the representation. However, awareness, though important, does not 
necessarily lead to behavioural change (Thrush et al., 1999).  
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 In addition to awareness, individuals will manifest distinct levels of 
understanding in relation to the representation, which might not correlate neatly with 
awareness levels. For instance, research shows that, although some 90 percent of the US 
population have heard about climate change, a significantly smaller percentage knows that 
the problem is related to energy use or that it could entail irreversible environmental 
consequences (Leiserowitz, 2003). Indeed, a key debate concerns more ‘effective’ 
communication in order to enhance public understanding of climate change, given that there 
is much discrepancy in levels of understanding (Moser & Dilling, 2007). The information 
deficit model suggests that communicators ought to enhance public understanding of climate 
change by providing more information (Lazo, Kinnell & Fisher, 2000). However, public 
understanding of the links between personal behaviour and climate change seem to be of 
greater relevance than understanding of the physics of climate change itself. Individuals may 
prefer and prioritise social representations that they more fully understand than those which 
are cognitively inaccessible (cf. Kahan et al., 2011). 
 Acceptance of a given social representation relates to the individual’s belief 
system. People can exhibit awareness and understanding of a given social representation, 
while accepting an alternative, contradictory representation. This is observable in individuals’ 
(re-)production of conspiracy theories regarding climate change, namely that scientists 
fabricate statistics in order to protect their careers (Jaspal et al., 2013). Although climate 
critics are acutely aware of the hegemonic representation of anthropogenic climate change, 
some sceptics attribute this representation to a ‘malevolent’ out-group, namely climate 
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scientists (Leiserowitz, 2006). As Nerlich’s (2010) work shows, subsequent to ‘Climategate’, 
many bloggers rejected this hegemonic representation in favour of the polemic representation 
that human-induced climate change constitutes a myth or conspiracy. Breakwell (2001, p. 
273) notes that the alternative contradictory representation may ‘share many of the common 
features of the [existing] social representation’. Indeed, sceptics do not necessarily reject the 
notion that the climate is changing, but they do often problematise the central dimension of 
the hegemonic representation concerning human agency in climate change (McCright, 2007).  
 Like acceptance, the assimilation of a social representation is pertinent to the 
individual’s belief system. Acceptance does not automatically lead to assimilation. It is 
possible to accept that human behaviour has contributed to climate change but to refuse to 
assimilate this representation within one’s existing network of knowledge. Knowledge and 
assimilation of the representation can be suppressed in order to avoid taking a ‘stance’ (see 
Breakwell & Millward, 1997). When a representation is assimilated at the individual level, 
‘cognitive and emotional processes ensure that it is anchored in prior personal 
representations’ (Breakwell, 2001, p. 273). In their UK-based interview study, Poortinga et 
al. (2011) found that politically conservative attitudes and traditional values seemed to shape 
people’s responses to social representations of climate change. More specifically, individuals 
with these attitudes and values were more likely to manifest scepticism in relation to climate 
change, although they did not necessarily deny its existence. Crucially, these respondents did 
accept representations of climate change but it was the assimilation of these representations 
to pre-existing attitudes and values (namely political conservatism and traditional values) that 
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seemed to induce scepticism. Research thus suggests that a social representation must first be 
assimilated in order for changes to take place within the identity structure for its 
accommodation (Breakwell, 1986). In the next subsection, we provide insight into the factors 
which seem to predict the assimilation of social representations. 
 The salience of a representation will differ across different individuals and 
groups, as well as across distinct temporal and socio-cultural contexts. Breakwell (2001) 
states that a social representation can acquire salience if it becomes relevant to the on-going 
activities of a group or individual. For instance, in the Maldives significant political and 
media attention to climate change has rendered salient representations of climate change 
among islanders (Pernetta, 1992). Conversely, Norgaard (2011) has observed in her study of 
a small town in Norway that, since climate change is not perceived as relevant to their on-
going activities, many inhabitants simply do not think about it and, thus, representations of it 
are latent. The anchoring process may actually render salient social representations of climate 
change, particularly if climate change is anchored to a phenomenon which is personally 
relevant, such as a personal experience of flooding, for instance (Whitmarsh, 2008). 
 The personalisation of social representations seems to be associated with the 
human tendency to protect identity processes (Breakwell, 2010). This is described next. 
 
Identity Processes 
Crompton and Kasser (2010) have argued that it is necessary to ascertain which elements of 
an individual’s identity will be threatened by tenets of climate science if we are to predict 
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their responses to climate change. Empirical research suggests that the acceptance and 
assimilation of social representations are guided by identity processes (Breakwell, 2001). 
Identity Process Theory (IPT) (Breakwell, 1986, 1993, 2001; Jaspal & Breakwell, 2014) 
provides an integrative theory of identity construction, threat and coping, by outlining: (i) the 
necessary components of a positive identity; (ii) social situations likely to ‘threaten’ identity 
and; (iii) the strategies likely to be implemented by the individual in order to cope with the 
threat. According to IPT, identity is guided by two processes: (i) the assimilation-
accommodation process refers to the absorption of social stimuli (i.e. social representations of 
climate change) in the identity structure and the adjustment which takes place in order for it 
to become part of the structure; and (ii) the evaluation process confers meaning and value 
upon these contents of identity.  
 The processes of assimilation-accommodation and evaluation are guided by a 
series of identity principles, which are essentially desirable ‘end-states’ for identity. 
Breakwell (1986) originally identified four identity principles and argued that individuals 
need to perceive appropriate levels of: (i) self-continuity and group-continuity across time 
(continuity); (ii) uniqueness and differentiation from relevant others (distinctiveness); (iii) 
competence and control over their lives (self-efficacy); (iv) feelings of personal worth (self-
esteem). In subsequent research, additional principles have been proposed but are not 
consensually acknowledged as part of IPT (Jaspal & Breakwell, 2014). These include (i) 
significance and purpose (meaning); and (ii) belonging within social groups (belonging); and 
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(iii) compatibility and coherence between elements of their identities (psychological 
coherence). 
 Whereas some existing work on environmental behaviours makes use of 
perhaps one or two similar constructs, such as efficacy and control, few, if any, such studies 
draw upon a coherent multi-level model such as IPT. Thus, for example, while Wall et al. 
(2007) argued that their study of car use choices in the UK highlighted the importance of 
personal obligation, altruism and a sense of control, we would argue that these are not just 
individual level variables, but that they are informed by relevant social representations, and 
the degree to which the individual endorses these as part of their on-going strategy to 
maintain and serve the identity principles laid out in IPT.  
IPT posits that if the individual cannot perceive appropriate levels of socio-
psychologically salient principles, identity is threatened, which is aversive for psychological 
well-being. Accordingly, the individual will attempt to minimise threat by engaging in coping 
strategies.  
While studies deploying models of values and altruism (e.g. the value belief norm 
theory of environmentalism, Stern, 2000) provide interesting insights into pro-environment 
behaviour, we argue they are too often focused on intra-psychic mechanisms and thus provide 
just one part of the picture. Furthermore, while some approaches to encouraging 
environmentally aware behaviours suggest finding ways to encourage individuals to ‘put on 
hold’ individual needs (Steg & Gifford, 2008), in contrast, our hybrid theoretical approach 
suggests that individuals will always be motivated to protect identity principles. Therefore, 
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rather than somehow aiming to turn off individual identity motives, a more adequate 
approach is to understand how pro-environmental behaviours can come to be seen as serving 
identity principles, while simultaneously ensuring that such behaviour does not threaten 
valued identity principles.  
 Given the centrality of human agency in constructing, monitoring and 
protecting identity (Breakwell, 1986), individuals will attempt to accept and assimilate those 
social representations that do not threaten these desirable identity end-states. For example, the 
alarmist representation that climate change will devastate the planet and result in large-scale 
catastrophe may plausibly threaten the group continuity principle, since the individual is led 
to believe that his or her immediate in-groups may cease to exist in the long-run. Moreover, 
the threat is likely to be chronic if there is no obvious ‘solution’ to climate change or 
mitigation strategy (Nicholson-Cole, 2004). Given its negative implications for the continuity 
principle, it is possible that this social representation will frequently be rejected by the 
individual. Breakwell’s (2001) model of personalisation is useful in illustrating how even 
those social representations which are not accepted and assimilated by individuals can 
nonetheless continue to jeopardise identity. Although the individual may reject the 
representation, at the social level it may remain salient through media reporting and 
interpersonal communication, which enables the representation to continually threaten 
identity. 
Similarly, the hegemonic representation of anthropogenic climate change generally 
advocates some form of behaviour change at both public and institutional levels. Enforced 
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behaviour change can potentially jeopardise the unifying psychological thread between past, 
present and future given that one’s lifestyle can become entrenched in one’s daily routine and 
overall sense of self. Often the changes required are regarded as ‘too radical’ and excessively 
disruptive for one’s sense of self. Behaviour change which interferes with one’s daily life 
convenience is likely to be construed as particularly threatening (Bord et al., 2000). The 
continuity principle may motivate individuals to reject the representation that major 
behaviour change is needed and instead accept and assimilate the contradictory representation 
that only ‘small changes’ are necessary for mitigation or adaptation. Furthermore, the 
enforced reduction of the use of fossil fuels could jeopardise self-efficacy and distinctiveness 
at the group level, since it may be regarded as threatening the unique economic competence 
and hegemony of one’s nation (e.g. in the U.S. context). 
In considering representations of mitigation techniques, which typically point to 
some form of behaviour change, it seems likely that some may be construed as threatening 
for identity among particular groups and individuals. For instance, the IPCC has 
recommended that members of the general public should refrain from consuming meat at 
least one day a week in order to make an effective personal contribution to climate change 
mitigation. However, in some socio-cultural contexts prevalent social representations of meat 
may render this problematic for identity due to meat consumption being associated with 
masculinity (Abrahamse et al., 2009), with abandonment of meat consumption therefore 
potentially threatening the continuity and distinctiveness principles of identity.  
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Murtagh, Gatersleben and Uzzell (2012) state that convincing the general public to 
re-think travel behaviour could lead to decreased carbon emissions with favourable outcomes 
for the environment. However, they acknowledge the potential threats to continuity, 
distinctiveness and self-esteem, which may be entailed by behaviour change and the adoption 
of sustainable pro-environmental behaviours. Similarly, in their investigation of motivations 
and barriers to adopting sustainable travel behaviour, Prillwitz and Barr (2009) highlight the 
potential impact of psychological attachment to one’s car as a variable affecting travel 
behaviour change, given that the car can, for some individuals, constitute an important 
element of identity.  
Given the complexity of identity processes, people may respond to representations 
of climate change in equally complex ways. The need for acceptance and inclusion in 
particular social circles (the belonging principle) might motivate some individuals to accept 
social representations of anthropogenic climate change. This is observable among young 
Britons of middle-class background, whose concern for environmental issues has been 
attributed to fear of alienation from society (Eckersley, 1989). Social desirability effects have 
been observed in survey-based research into environmental problems with some participants 
allegedly ‘overstating’ their environmental concerns (Sterngold et al., 1994).  
Alarmist representations of climate change seem to jeopardise the self-efficacy 
principle of identity and lead to disempowerment of social actors (Milne, Sheeran & Orbell, 
2000). Yet, self-efficacy seems to be important in the context of climate change (Breakwell, 
2010). Moser (2007) argues that threat representations are most likely to be effective in 
23	  
	  
causing persistent attitude change and in motivating ‘constructive’ responses when people 
regard themselves as being in control and competent (self-efficacy). This hypothesis 
reinforces the assertion that alarmist representations of climate change can be 
counterproductive (Hulme, 2009). 
The remainder of the paper now turns to an exploration of the patterns of socio-
psychological action which may ensue from human exposure to social representations of 
climate change. 
 
Socio-Psychological Action 
Here we provide some insight into potential socio-psychological strategies for dealing with 
real or anticipated threat to identity as a result of representations of climate change. For 
reasons of space, we can only provide a sketch of major trends in research. 
 
Behavioural Predictors 
The information deficit model postulates that individuals lack sufficient information to 
engage with climate change adequately (Lazo et al., 2000), and thereby assumes a 
straightforward relationship between awareness of social representations and behaviour. 
However, empirical research demonstrates that risk representations are generally poor 
predictors of behaviour, with examples in the fields of sexual behaviour (Breakwell & 
Millward, 1997) and smoking (Hansen et al., 2010). These studies converge in showing that 
where a behaviour is perceived as important to self-esteem and other principles, it is likely to 
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persist, despite awareness of potential risks. Thus, in addition to considering risk 
representations, it is necessary for the researcher to examine the ways in which particular 
behaviours (e.g. use of one’s car; the consumption of meat) might impinge upon identity 
processes in specific socio-cultural settings. This can enable the researcher to predict the 
adoption or avoidance of pro-environmental behaviours. The more a change is construed as 
threatening for identity, the less willing one will be to endorse it. The next section examines 
how individuals may cope with identity threat. 
 
Strategies for Averting and Coping with Threat 
IPT theorises socio-psychological action in terms of strategies for ‘coping’ with real, or pre-
emptively averting, threat to the motivational principles of identity (Breakwell, 1986). 
Individuals will seek to maintain appropriate levels of identity principles by engaging in such 
strategies, which are conceptualised as ‘any activity, in thought or deed, which has as its goal 
the removal or modification of a threat to identity’ (p. 78). Coping strategies can function at 
the intra-psychic, interpersonal and/or intergroup levels. 
 
Intra-psychic Strategies 
IPT would predict that individuals will respond to social representations of climate change by 
engaging in action at the intra-psychic level.  
Given that the hegemonic representation of anthropogenic climate change and its 
related components concerning necessary behaviour change may threaten identity, 
25	  
	  
individuals may engage in deflection strategies, such as denial (Hulme, 2009; McCright, 
2007). There are various socio-psychological incentives for denying the reality of climate 
change (Diethelm & McKee, 2009). Denial of its existence obviates the need for significant 
behaviour change which might threaten the continuity principle. Thus, the strategy of denying 
the threatening stimulus (i.e. climate change) enables the individual to do nothing (Breakwell, 
1986). Accordingly, denial as a response to threatening stimuli may be regarded as more of 
an inaction strategy, rather than an action strategy. 
Individuals may attempt to reinterpret or redefine social reality in order to protect 
identity. For instance, sections of the British public do indeed acknowledge the reality of 
climate change but they may re-interpret it as ‘a natural process’ which is not dependent upon 
human actions (Castell, 2010, p. 6). Lowe et al. (2006) note that their participants re-
conceptualised climate change as ‘one of the many’ upheavals with which human beings 
have had to cope in the past, essentially attenuating the novelty, uniqueness and urgency of 
climate change. The threatening stimulus is not denied but its meanings and implications are 
re-considered so that it no longer poses a threat. Like outright denial, reinterpretation of the 
threatening stimulus has the psychological advantage of questioning the necessity of 
changing one’s behaviour, which itself could threaten continuity. Deflection strategies such 
as denial and reinterpretation will likely ensue from alarmist and fatalist representations of 
climate change. 
 Individuals may, conversely, accept the hegemonic representation of 
anthropogenic climate change and, in principle, accept the implication that behaviour change 
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is necessary but disassociate this information from their own behaviour. The 
compartmentalism strategy consists of ‘drawing a strict boundary around the dissatisfying 
addition to the identity structure [which is] not permitted to contaminate the rest of identity’ 
(Breakwell, 1986, p. 95). The compartmentalisation of the hegemonic representation of 
anthropogenic climate change means that it is accepted and assimilated to identity but that it 
need not have implications for other aspects of identity, such as long-standing behavioural 
practices. Individuals do not actively perceive a link (or refrain from making the link) 
between their behaviour (e.g. driving a car with high emissions) and the environmental 
problem of climate change when these are compartmentalised. Therefore, compartmentalism 
may constitute a psychosocial strategy for safeguarding feelings of continuity, since previous 
behaviours remain unaffected, and psychological coherence, given that the inconsistency 
between the hegemonic representation and the “problematic” behaviours is not 
acknowledged. 
 These intra-psychic strategies protect identity by deflecting the threats that 
may be induced by the hegemonic representation of climate change.    
 
Interpersonal and Intergroup Strategies 
One of the unique strengths of our theoretical framework, which brings together IPT and 
SRT, is that it encompasses not just the individual or intra-psychic level of analysis common 
in attitudinal research (Kahan et al., 2011), but also the interpersonal, intergroup and societal 
levels. Responses to identity threat, for example, can occur, and should be studied, at all 
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levels (Jaspal & Breakwell, 2014). At the social level, individuals will engage in 
interpersonal and intergroup strategies for protecting identity in response to social 
representations of climate change (Smith & Joffe, 2013). This is because climate change 
exists as a social phenomenon, as well as a psychological one.  
 Human beings typically belong to a number of distinct social groups. It may 
be possible for individuals to avert identity threat by shifting psychological salience/self-
categorisation from one group membership to another, since particular sets of social 
representations are often more associated with a given social group membership (Breakwell, 
1993, 2001). As a human being (a superordinate group membership), one might be concerned 
about the potential risks posed by human-induced industrial activity to the well-being of the 
planet. However, when one’s membership in a subgroup category (e.g. American national 
identity) acquires psychological salience, individuals may come to regard climate change as a 
geographically distant phenomenon, as is observable in survey-based research in the US 
(Leiserowitz, 2005). Membership in this subgroup may bring to the psychological forefront a 
distinct range of priorities and responsibilities, which are reified in social representations 
associated with this subgroup membership. Thus, social representations associated with the 
superordinate category ‘human being’, which have the ability to threaten the principles of 
continuity, distinctiveness and self-efficacy, can be eschewed when particular subgroup 
memberships become central to self-definition. Furthermore, Smith and Joffe (2013) note that 
individuals may use “othering” strategies to protect in-group identity from threat. Researchers 
should attempt to examine, in a contextually sensitive manner, the risk representations 
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associated with individuals’ immediate or psychologically salient group memberships in 
order to predict how and when the strategy of shifting between multiple group memberships 
may be deployed. 
 In addition to the group memberships individuals already have, they may 
actively join or create groups in order to avert identity threat. History has demonstrated that 
individuals experiencing threat may unite in order to create a new group based around 
particular social representations. For instance, the socially and economically disadvantaged 
lower caste groups in India have united with others who share their predicament in order to 
encourage positive social change (Jaspal, 2011). Such group behaviour can be observed with 
regard to pro- and anti-environmental groups in the context of climate change (Eckersley, 
1989; McCright, 2007).  
More generally, it can be hypothesised that individuals will employ deflection 
strategies when the self-efficacy principle is weakened by alarmist representations of climate 
change. The particular strategy employed is contingent largely upon the type of social 
representation (i.e. hegemonic, polemic). Conversely, use of the interpersonal and intergroup 
strategies depends upon the salience of particular principles in the first instance. For instance, 
those who value (national) self-efficacy may shift between their group memberships, while 
those who value belonging might opt for participation in pressure groups. 
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Conclusion 
This paper brings a new perspective to the study of climate change that has its roots in recent 
developments in SRT and IPT (Jaspal & Breakwell, 2014). This has enabled us to shed new 
light on links between social representations of climate change, identity and action providing 
preliminary theoretical insights that are grounded in previous empirical research.  
When taking into consideration the role of identity processes, it is possible to 
predict the acceptance, assimilation and salience of particular social representations of 
climate change among individuals. Moreover, by bridging SRT and IPT it may even be 
possible to predict behavioural responses. The synthesis of social representation and identity 
has been presented through the lens of IPT, which postulates that individuals need to 
maintain appropriate levels of particular identity principles and that they will behave in ways 
that restore appropriate levels of the principles when they are threatened. This hybrid 
approach makes a novel contribution to the field of climate change, given that scholars have 
recently been arguing for an identity-based approach to climate change (Crompton & Kasser, 
2010; Murtagh et al., 2012). Moreover, this paper makes specific assertions about how 
elements of identity (e.g. group memberships) and the principles of identity may be affected 
by particular social representations. The theoretical pay-off may be significant given that this 
hybrid approach may be relevant to a broader range of environmental issues. 
 In the context of climate change, continuity seems to constitute a particularly 
important identity principle, given the perceived threat of climate change (as an 
environmental problem) to human beings and the potential threats that enforced behaviour 
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change can entail for everyday lifestyles. Indeed, Dunwoody (2007) observes that ‘strong’ 
beliefs, or beliefs which are central to one’s sense of self, will be defended when seen as 
being contradicted by new incoming information, such as prescriptions about sustainable 
behaviour in the context of climate change. It seems likely that individuals will respond more 
favourably to recommendations concerning behaviour change when the recommended 
change is framed and perceived as being less disruptive to everyday lifestyles. Otherwise, a 
threat to continuity is likely to activate deflection strategies which in turn block any perceived 
need for change. Consequently, social constructionist analyses of how climate change and 
behaviour changes are represented are necessary. More specifically, there is a need to 
examine empirically how the processes of anchoring and objectification are deployed in 
channels of societal information in order to identify which social representations are 
emerging on the cultural landscape. 
 Enforced behaviour change could threaten feelings of distinctiveness and self-
esteem, particularly if the enhancement of these principles is contingent upon the 
maintenance of existing practices. An important next step in this field is to examine 
empirically the psychosocial meanings of particular social practices and their effects for 
identity processes in specific cultural groups and communities – this will reveal the socio-
psychological outcomes of requiring a transition to more sustainable behaviours and practices 
and the likelihood of their acceptance and assimilation by the general public. It is unlikely 
that individuals will endorse a behaviour or practice that does not provide appropriate levels 
of self-esteem, distinctiveness and so on.  
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We also draw attention to the links between social representations, identity 
processes and possible coping strategies. Individuals may engage in deflection strategies (e.g. 
denial, reinterpretation) when confronted with identity-threatening representations of climate 
change (Breakwell, 1986). We hypothesise that deflection strategies will likely ensue from 
exposure to alarmist and fatalist representations of climate change, given that these 
representations typically provide the individual with no other way in which to respond 
(Breakwell, 2010). On the other hand, when representations of climate change are 
collectively and pervasively regarded as threatening for identity, it is likely that individuals 
will engage in intergroup strategies such as the formation of pressure groups in order to 
tackle the threat or, indeed, affirm its existence (McCright, 2007). 
In conclusion, this paper provides preliminary insight into an integrative theoretical 
framework in which social representations of climate change, identity and socio-
psychological action can be collectively examined. This framework makes a useful 
contribution to social sciences research into climate change, given that it theorises the inter-
relations between construction, perception and behaviour. In this paper, we do not attempt to 
provide a polished communication model for campaigners but rather a theoretical “tool-kit” 
for conducting systematic empirical research into representation, cognition and action and the 
inter-relations between them. However, systematic and multi-methodological empirical 
research, based on the hypotheses developed in this paper, should inform future models of 
communicating climate change and other environmental issues. At a more general level, it is 
necessary to take into account the psychosocial meanings that both climate and enforced 
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behaviour change can have for the diverse groups and communities affected by climate 
change, a global social, psychological and environmental issue. A key strength of the 
framework is its encompassing of multiple levels of analysis, moving from intra-psychic 
through interpersonal and intergroup, to societal levels of analysis. Given this breadth, our 
framework also provides a way of integrating qualitative and quantitative research methods, 
both of which can provide valuable insights into what environmental issues, such as climate 
change, mean to groups and individuals. 
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